## Predicate Logic aka First-Order Logic

Predicate logic is a formal system consisting of the following four ingredients.
An alphabet $\Sigma=\{(),,,, \neg, \rightarrow, \forall, \exists\} \dot{\cup} \mathcal{P} \cup \dot{\mathcal{F}} \dot{\mathcal{C}} \dot{\cup} V$ including a set $\mathcal{P}$ of predicate letters $P_{i}^{n}$, a set $\mathcal{F}$ of function letters $f_{i}^{n}$, a set $\mathcal{C}$ of constant symbols $c_{i}$ and a set $V$ of variables $x_{i}, i, n \geq 0$.
Terms which are defined recursively:

- Every variable $x_{i} \in V$ and every constant $c_{i} \in \mathcal{C}$ is a term.
- If $t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}$ are terms, then so is $f_{i}^{n}\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$ for every $n$-ary function letter $f_{i}^{n} \in \mathcal{F}$.
- Nothing else is a term.

Well formed formulæ (wff for short) are also defined recursively:

- $P_{i}^{n}\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$ is a wff for any terms $t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}$ and $n$-ary predicate letter $P_{i}^{n} \in \mathcal{P}$.
- If $A$ and $B$ are wff, then so are $(\neg A)$ and $(A \rightarrow B)$.
- If $A$ is a wff, then so are $\left(\forall x_{i}\right) A$ and $\left(\exists x_{i}\right) A$ for any variable $x_{i} \in V$.
- Nothing else is a wff.

Five axiom schemes for any wff $A, B$ and $C$ :

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\begin{array}{ll}
\text { Ax1: } & (A \rightarrow(B \rightarrow A)) \\
\text { Ax2: } & ((A \rightarrow(B \rightarrow C)) \rightarrow((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow(A \rightarrow C))) \\
\text { Ax3: } & (((\neg B) \rightarrow(\neg A)) \rightarrow(A \rightarrow B)) \\
\text { Ax4: } & \left(\forall x_{i}\right) A\left(x_{i}\right) \rightarrow A(t) \text {, where the term } t \text { is free for } x_{i} \text { in } A \\
\text { Ax5: } & \left(\forall x_{i}\right)(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow\left(A \rightarrow\left(\forall x_{i}\right) B\right), \text { if there is no free } x_{i} \text { in } A
\end{array}
$$

Deductions are sequences of wff in which every entry is either an (instance of an) axiom, a hypothesis or obtained from previous entries in the sequence $\mathcal{D}$ using either
Modus Ponens (MP): If $A,(A \rightarrow B) \in \mathcal{D}$, then $\mathcal{D} \cup\{B\}$ is a deduction, for any $A, B \in \mathcal{W}$; or Generalisation (G): If $A \in \mathcal{D}$, then $\mathcal{D} \cup\left\{\left(\forall x_{i}\right) A\right\}$ is a deduction, for any $A \in \mathcal{W}$ and $x_{i} \in V$.
If $C$ can be deduced from the hypotheses $A_{1}, A_{2}, \ldots A_{n}$ we write $\left\{A_{1}, A_{2}, \ldots A_{n}\right\} \vdash C$.
Deduction Theorem (DT). For $\Delta \subseteq \mathcal{W}$ and $A \in \mathcal{W}$, if $\Delta \cup\{A\} \vdash B$ using (G) only with $x_{i}$ which is not free in $A$, then $\Delta \vdash A \rightarrow B$.
Proof. Same as in APL plus the case when $B$ was deduced using (G), i.e. $B=\left(\forall x_{i}\right) C$ and $x_{i}$ is not free in $A$. Here, $\mathcal{I H}$ gives $\Delta \vdash A \rightarrow C$, whence $\Delta \vdash\left(\forall x_{i}\right)(A \rightarrow C)$ by (G), and so $A \rightarrow\left(\forall x_{i}\right) C$ from A×5 and MP.
Transitivity of Implication (TI). $\{A \rightarrow B, B \rightarrow C\} \vdash A \rightarrow C$ (As in APL from DT; no (G) needed.)
Interpretations give rise to semantics/meaning. An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ consists of a non-empty domain $D_{\mathcal{I}}$ of objects, assignments of objects to the constant symbols $\mathcal{I}\left(c_{i}\right) \in D_{\mathcal{I}}$, as well as choices of $n$-ary relations $\mathcal{I}\left(P_{i}^{n}\right) \subseteq D_{\mathcal{I}}{ }^{n}$ and an $n$-ary functions $\mathcal{I}\left(f_{i}^{n}\right): D_{\mathcal{I}}^{n} \rightarrow D_{\mathcal{I}}$ for all symbols $P_{i}^{n}$ and $f_{i}^{n}$.
A valuation $v$ in an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ assigns objects in $D_{\mathcal{I}}$ to all the variables, and hence to all terms, by setting $v\left(c_{i}\right)=\mathcal{I}\left(c_{i}\right)$ and (recursively) defining $v\left(f_{i}^{n}\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)\right)=\mathcal{I}\left(f_{i}^{n}\right)\left(v\left(t_{1}\right), \ldots, v\left(t_{n}\right)\right)$. We write $\mathcal{I} \models_{v} A$ if the valuation $v$ in the interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ satisfies the wff $A$, which is defined recursively:

- $\mathcal{I} \models_{v} P_{i}^{n}\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$ if and only if $\left(v\left(t_{1}\right), \ldots, v\left(t_{n}\right)\right) \in \mathcal{I}\left(P_{i}^{n}\right)$;
- $\mathcal{I} \models_{v}(\neg A)$ if and only if $\mathcal{I} \not \models_{v} A$, i.e. $\mathcal{I} \models_{v} A$ does not hold;
- $\mathcal{I} \models_{v}(A \rightarrow B)$ if and only if $\mathcal{I} \models_{v} B$ or $\mathcal{I} \models_{v} \neg A$;
- $\mathcal{I} \models_{v}\left(\forall x_{i}\right) A$ if and only if $\mathcal{I} \models_{u} A$ for all valuations $u$ in $\mathcal{I}$ with $v\left(x_{j}\right)=u\left(x_{j}\right)$ for $j \neq i$.
- $\mathcal{I} \models_{v}\left(\exists x_{i}\right) A$ if and only if $\mathcal{I}=_{u} A$ for some valuation $u$ in $\mathcal{I}$ with $v\left(x_{j}\right)=u\left(x_{j}\right)$ for $j \neq i$.

Lemma. If $v$ is a valuation in an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$, then $\mathcal{I} \models_{v}\left(\exists x_{i}\right) A$ if and only if $\mathcal{I} \models_{v} \neg\left(\forall x_{i}\right)(\neg A)$.
The wff $A$ is valid or true in the interpretation $\mathcal{I}$, written $\mathcal{I} \models A$, if $\mathcal{I} \models_{v} A$ for all valuations $v$ in $\mathcal{I}$. And $A$ is called logically valid or simply valid, written $\models A$, if $\mathcal{I} \models A$ for all interpretations $\mathcal{I}$.
Theorem. Predicate Logic is sound $(\vdash A$ implies $\models A$ ), consistent ( not both $\vdash A$ and $\vdash \neg A$ ) and complete $(\models A$ implies $\vdash A)$.
Proof of soundness. As for APL, this is by induction on the length of a deduction sequence for $A$ :
Induction Base: $\forall \vDash \mathrm{A} \times 1 \Rightarrow \models A \& \not \models(B \rightarrow A) \Rightarrow \models B \& \not \models A$, contradiction; $\mathrm{A} \times 2$ and $\mathrm{A} \times 3$ similarly.
$\not \models \mathrm{A} \times 4 \Rightarrow \vDash\left(\forall x_{i}\right) A \& \not \vDash A(t)$, contradiction because $t$ is free for $x_{i}$ in $A$.
$\not \vDash \mathrm{A} \times 5 \Rightarrow \models\left(\forall x_{i}\right)(A \rightarrow B) \& \models A \& \not \vDash\left(\forall x_{i}\right) B \Rightarrow$ there are $\mathcal{I}$ and $v$ with $\mathcal{I} \not \forall_{v} B$
$\Rightarrow \mathcal{I} \not \vDash_{v}(A \rightarrow B)($ as $\models A) \Rightarrow \not \models\left(\forall x_{i}\right)(A \rightarrow B)$, contradiction
Induction Step: $\models A \& \models(A \rightarrow B) \Rightarrow \models A \&(\not \models A$ or $\models B) \Rightarrow \models B$, so MP is sound.
$\vDash A \Rightarrow \models\left(\forall x_{i}\right) A$, because this depends on less values than $\models A$, so G is sound.
Completeness is known as Gödel's Completeness Theroem and not proved here.

